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 1. Introduction 
 
Because of the conviction that R&D (research and development) earns a high social rate 
of return, contributes to economic growth or assures competitiveness, governments spend 
a non negligible amount of money to induce firms to invest in R&D. A popular measure 
in this regards is the policy of R&D tax incentives. It reduces the corporate income taxes 
or the employer’s social security contributions in proportion to the R&D effort and 
thereby decreases the cost of doing R&D so that firms move closer to the R&D level that 
would be socially optimal. This policy has the virtue of being neutral, i.e. giving a tax 
relief to any kind of R&D expenditure, although some governments give special credits 
to for instance environmental R&D or R&D done in collaboration with universities.  
 
The policy of R&D tax incentives has been in place for many years in countries like the 
U.S., France or Canada. It was adopted in the UK a few years ago and is presently being 
considered to be introduced in Germany. While in 1996, 12 OECD countries offered 
R&D tax incentives, in 2008 this number increased to 21. France, Canada, Norway, 
Australia and the Netherlands re-evaluate the usefulness and the effectiveness of their 
R&D tax incentives on a regular basis, because of its ever increasing importance in the 
science and technology budget. France and Spain recently reformed their policy of R&D 
tax credits.  
 
This paper has two objectives. The first is to review how the effectiveness of R&D tax 
incentives has been assessed in previous evaluations, trying in this way to build up a 
comprehensive evaluation scheme, which would encompass previous evaluation 
approaches, and to sort out and harmonize various notions and measurements. How do 
cost effectiveness, additionality, and net welfare gain relate to each other? Is cost 
effectiveness the same thing as the bang for the buck? Where do econometric evaluations 
enter the cost/benefit analysis? This is the object of section 2. The second objective is to 
assess the sensitivity of the evaluation outcome to the magnitude of certain parameters. Is 
additionality a must for having an effective R&D tax incentive policy? How high must 
the externality parameter be to overcome the negative effect of administration costs or the 
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costs of distortionary taxation? This is the object of section 3. In section 4 we report on 
the success of a past policy changes in the Netherlands, and we simulate the effect of 
various parameter changes in the existing Dutch R&D tax incentive scheme. 
 
2. Reconciling notions and evaluation methods 
 
2.1 The notion of additionality 
 
The R&D tax incentive policy is aimed at making private enterprises spend more on 
R&D to get closer to the social optimum. The most common way to verify whether a tax 
incentive policy is effective is to test for additionality as opposed to crowding out of 
R&D. If firms do nothing but substitute private R&D financing by tax support, then there 
is full crowding out, and the policy is clearly ineffective. If firms substitute part of their 
own funding by government funding, there is partial crowding out. If they spend an 
amount of R&D in excess of the amount of tax incentives they get from government then 
the policy is said to lead to additional R&D.  
 
Testing for additionality somehow amounts to comparing the tax expenditures with the 
additional amount of R&D spent by private firms. It involves the computation of the 
“bang for the buck” (BFTB), which, as noted by Parsons and Phillips (2007), is also 
known in the literature as “incrementality ratio”, “cost effectiveness ratio” or “tax 
sensitivity ratio”. It is measured by dividing the amount of R&D generated by the R&D 
tax incentives by the net tax revenue loss (also called tax expenditures). It has not always 
been done correctly, as reported by Hall and van Reenen (2000). Some authors have 
added up all credits claimed without considering the change in the firms’ tax positions 
because of the tax credit. For instance, in the Netherlands the tax credits that can be 
deducted from the firm’s social security contributions are themselves taxable. Other 
studies have calculated the tax credits claimed taking an average firm and ignoring the 
firms’ heterogeneity in the type of R&D they do and in their sensitivity to the tax credits. 
 
 4
The R&D tax credits may be based on the level of R&D and or the incremental R&D 
with respect to a reference. The amount claimed by a firm may depend on the revenue 
position of the firm and the possibility to carry forward or backward, or to claim for 
refundability of, unused tax credits. The rates may vary depending on the size of the firm 
or its amount of R&D. In principle, everything should be quantifiable but the researcher 
might not have all the information on hand to compute the claimable tax credits correctly. 
Moreover, there may be a difference between the tax credits computed on the basis of the 
reported expenditures and the statutory tax rates, the actually claimed tax credits or those 
finally approved by the tax authorities. And, there may a timing problem between the 
date the credits are claimed and the date they are received. Table 1 presents the 
magnitude of the cost of fiscal R&D incentives, in absolute amount, as a proportion of 
GDP and in comparison with the magnitude of direct government support. It also 
indicates the types of R&D fiscal incentives. Some countries, like Germany or Finland, 
have no R&D tax incentives. They only have direct government support. Canada, the 
Netherlands and Australia rely more on R&D tax incentives than on direct government 
support for R&D.  The other countries listed in table 1 rely more on direct support for 
R&D. 
 
One way to estimate the additional R&D generated by the R&D tax incentives is to ask 
firms directly whether tax incentives make a difference to their R&D expenditures. There 
is at least the suspicion that either firms do not know how much R&D they would have 
done in the absence of R&D tax credits, or that they are biased in their responses so as to 
be able to continue benefiting from it. It should, however, be noted that the Australian 
evaluation by the Bureau of Industry Economics (1993) reports consistency between 
declarations by firms and econometric evidence of additionality.  
 
A more objective way to estimate the extent of additionality is to use econometric 
techniques. There are two broad approaches to isolate the effect of R&D tax incentives 
on R&D: the structural modeling approach and the treatment evaluation method. The 
structural modeling approach consists in regressing an R&D demand equation (in terms 
of stocks or flows, but preferably stocks if enough observations are available to construct 
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them) on its typical determinants, among which the user cost of R&D incorporating the 
R&D tax parameters. A dummy taking the value one for R&D tax credit as opposed to 
firms or periods without tax credits would also be feasible, but then the foregone tax 
revenue would be more difficult to calculate. In contrast, the user cost of R&D includes a 
quantification of the tax incentives via what has come to be known as the B-index. The 
B-index, introduced by Warda and McFetridge (1983), is defined as the ratio of the net 
cost of a Euro spent on R&D, after all quantifiable tax incentives have been accounted 
for, to the net income from one Euro of revenue. In other words, the B-index indicates the 
marginal income before taxes needed for the marginal R&D investment to break even. 
This method has been used by Hall (1993), Bloom, Griffith and van Reenen (2002), 
Dagenais, Mohnen and Therrien (2004), Mairesse and Mulkay (2004), Wilson (2005),  
and Baghana and Mohnen (2009). 
 
Table 1  Public support for innovation policies in various countries 
 
Country Cost of fiscal 
R&D 
incentives as a 
% of GDP 
Magnitude of 
R&D tax 
incentives in 
2005 
(Millions US$ 
in PPP) 
Magnitude of 
direct 
government 
funding for 
R&D as a % of 
GDP 
Type of indirect 
support for 
R&D 
2008 
Australia 0.05 (2004) 356 0.04 (2003) V, I, SL, R 
Canada 0.15 (2004) 2 990.4 0.03 (2004) V, SL, R 
France 0.03 (2002) 1 009.9 0.15 (2002) V, SL, S 
Japan 0.01 (2003) 3.3 0.02 (2003) I 
Netherlands 0.09 (2005) 419.3 0.04 (2003) V, SL, S, R 
Norway 0.01 (2004) 137.0 0.10 (2003) V, SL, R 
United Kingdom 0.05 (2004) 937.3 0.13 (2003) V, SL, R 
United States 0.06 (2001) 5 110.0 0.17 (2001)  I (mostly), R 
 
Sources:  
OECD Science, Technology and Industry: Scoreboard 2007;  
European Commission, DG Research, “Comparing practices in R&D tax incentives 
evaluation”, Expert group on R&D tax incentives evaluation. 
OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, 2008 
Cervantes (2007) 
 
Notes: 
V: volume-based; I: increment-based; SL: different treatments for small and large firms; 
S: special measures for start-up firms: R: some kind of refundability 
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It is important here to recognize the endogeneity of the tax credit, as the rates generally 
vary with the amount of R&D. Likewise the dummy that tax credits have been claimed is 
endogenous, because firms may, for fear of being audited, sheer ignorance or compliance 
costs, decide not to apply for R&D tax credits.1 Handling this endogeneity calls for good 
instruments. It is important to allow for the fact that the induced R&D may take time to 
show up because of adjustment costs in R&D (finding scientists and engineers, setting up 
a lab, devising projects). Therefore a difference should be made between short-term and 
long-term effects. Finally, when comparing studies one should be careful not to compare 
elasticities, with semi-elasticities or absolute derivatives for the price effect on R&D. 
 
The treatment evaluation methods consist in running quasi-experiments or constructing 
counterfactuals. Matching estimators compare the average R&D effort of firms that 
receive R&D tax credits with the average R&D of firms that do not but that are otherwise 
similar, for instance in having the same likelihood of receiving R&D tax credits but 
prefering not to apply for them (Czarnitzki, Hanel and Rosa, 2004; Duguet, 2007).2 The 
difference-in-differences estimator compare the R&D of firms in the control and treated 
groups before and after a policy change, in this case a new feature in R&D tax incentives 
(Cornet and Vroomen, 2005). In regression discontinuity design one compares the R&D 
of firms that are affected with those that are unaffected by an exogenous discontinuity in 
the treatment function, for example firms just below and just above a ceiling in the 
conditions for being eligible to receive R&D tax credits (Haegeland and Moen, 2007b).  
 
Table 2 lists some of the recent studies that appeared after the well-known Hall and van 
Reenen (2000) survey, and summarizes the method used, the type of R&D tax credit 
evaluated, and the results obtained.  The BFTB is typically above 1 for incremental R&D 
tax credits, and below 1 for level-based R&D tax credits. 
 
                                                 
1 The latest evaluation of the R&D tax incentives in the Netherlands (de Jong and Verhoeven, 2007)  
reports that for firms with less than 10 employees only one firm out of 3 applies for R&D tax credits. 
2 In this particular instance, the matching estimator is perhaps not the most appropriate method because the 
choice of being in the treatment or in the control group is not quite exogenous. 
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Table 2  Survey of R&D tax credit evaluations published after Hall and van 
Reenen’s (2000) survey paper (for a complementary survey, see Parsons and 
Phillips, 2007) 
 
Study Country 
and data 
Method Type of 
R&D 
tax 
credit2
Bang for the 
buck 
Welfare gain  Policy conclusions 
Bloom, 
Griffith, 
van 
Reenen 
(2002) 
Panel   
nine OECD 
countries 
1979-1997 
R&D demand 
equation; CES 
prod. Fct; partial 
adjustment 
L & I   Fiscal provisions matter: 
price elasticity of R&D -
0.1 in short term, around -1 
in long term 
Czarnitzki, 
Hanel and 
Rosa 
(2004) 
Canada Evaluation 
treatment 
(matching 
estimators) 
L & I   R&D tax credit receivers 
have higher innovative, but 
not higher economic 
performance 
Dagenais, 
Mohnen, 
Therrien 
(2004) 
Panel 
Canadian 
firm data 
1975-1992 
R&D demand 
equation with 
endog. selection; 
partial adjustment
L & I 0.98-1.04 
for L 
4.0 for I 
 Deadweight loss = 80% of 
costs to government 
Mairesse 
and 
Mulkay 
(2004) 
France 
Panel of 
firm data, 
1983-1997 
R&D demand 
equation; CES 
prod. function; 
ECM3
I 2.0 to 3.6  Incremental R&D tax 
incentives stimulate R&D 
Russo 
(2004) 
 Computable 
general 
equilibrium 
model 
L & I Higher for  I 
than for  L 
17.6 elasticity 
w/t tax 
expend. for I,  
unitary  
elasticity for 
L 
Incremental R&D tax 
credits dominate level-
based tax credits 
Cornet and 
Vroomen 
(2005) 
Netherlands 
Panel  
Firm data 
1998-2003 
Evaluation 
treatment 
(difference in 
differences) 
L For starter’s 
facility: 0.5 
to 0.8, for 
lenthening 
of first tax-
credit 
bracket: 0.1 
to 0.2 
 Without spillover effects, 
starter’s facility and 
lengthening of first tax 
credit bracket not effective 
Wilson 
(2005) 
USA 
Panel  
States 
1981-2002 
R&D demand 
equation; CES 
prod.function; 
partial adjustment
L&I   Inside-state cost elasticity 
close to -1 in long run; out-
of-state elasticity almost as 
large so that aggregate 
elasticity close to -0.1 
Duguet 
(2007) 
France 
Panel 
Evaluation 
treatment. 
I 1.00-3.30  Incremental R&D tax 
credits stimulate R&D 
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Firm data 
1993-2003 
(matching 
estimators) 
Haegeland 
and Møen 
(2007b) 
Norway 
Panel 
Firm data 
1993-2005 
Evaluation 
treatment 
(difference in 
difference) 
L 2.00  Additionality is stronger in 
small, low-tech, and low-
skilled firms (i.e. firms 
with little prior R&D) 
Lokshin 
and 
Mohnen 
(2007) 
Netherlands R&D demand 
equation; CES 
prod. function; 
partial adjutsment
L 0.80-1.40 in 
short run 
0.31-0.75 in 
long run 
 Deadweight loss due to 
level-based tax incentives, 
especially for large firms 
Parsons & 
Phillips 
(2007) 
Canada Cost/benefit 
analysis 
L & I  10.9 % rate1 R&D spillovers are 
necessary to justify R&D 
tax credits 
Cappelen, 
Raknerud, 
Rybalka 
(2008) 
Norway 
panel 
Firm data 
Innovation 
surveys of 
2001 and 
2004 
Logit for 
innovation output 
with endogenous 
R&D tax dummy. 
Use of IV 
L   R&D tax incentives 
increase innovation in 
processes and products 
new to the firm, but not in 
products new to the market 
and patenting 
Baghana-
Mohnen 
(2009) 
Quebec 
Panel firm 
data 
1997-2003 
R&D demand 
equation; CES 
prod. function; 
partial adjustment
L & I   Low price elasticity for 
R&D (.14 in long run). 
Deadweight loss for level-
based tax incentives for 
large firms, not for small 
firms 
 
1Net welfare gain includes externalities, administration & compliance costs, excessive 
burden of taxation. 
2L = level based R&D tax credits; I = incremental R&D tax credits 
3ECM = error correction model 
 
 
 
2.2 Cost-benefit calculations or net welfare effects 
 
A more comprehensive computation of the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives would 
require a full cost-benefit analysis. It would require computing the total (direct and 
indirect) costs and benefits related to the R&D tax incentive. On the benefit side, it would 
mean not just computing the amount of additional R&D but also the return on that R&D. 
The return on the marginal R&D may be lower since the R&D would not have been 
undertaken without the tax incentive. That requires looking into the existence of second-
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order and third-order effects, as explained in the following section, i.e. the effects on 
innovation behavior and on an economic performance measure like productivity or 
profitability. Another kind of secondary effect is the R&D induced by increased output 
stemming from the additional R&D (see Bernstein, 1986). There could also be a return 
from making firms become R&D performers3 and from attracting footloose investors 
(multinational companies attracted by tax incentives). A proper social cost-benefit 
analysis would also require incorporating R&D spillovers, which can be positive (rent or 
knowledge externalities) or negative (market stealing or obsolescence). 
 
On the cost side of the assessment should be included implementation costs, such as 
hiring consultants, accountants, financial experts; administration costs such as hiring 
auditors, tax officers; the existence of wage effects diluting the quantity effects, inter-
temporal differences in the timing of costs and benefits, as well as the opportunity costs 
of having to raise income taxes to finance the tax incentives. A somewhat more remote 
possibility is that domestic R&D tax incentives could benefit foreign firms and decrease 
the domestic firms’ competitive position or conversely make domestic firms more 
receptive to international R&D spillovers. In this respect Wilson (2005) estimates that 
firms are very receptive to variations in the within-state R&D tax incentives, but also 
almost to the same extent to variations in the best out-of-state R&D tax incentives, with a 
net aggregate effect close to 0. 
 
 
2.3 Second-order and third-order effects 
 
It is not sufficient to show additionality in R&D, the additional R&D should also yield a 
positive rate of return for there to be a private benefit. A number of studies have 
examined the effects of tax incentives on various measures or aspects of innovation 
(patents, the share of innovative products in total sales, the propensity to come up with 
new products, new to the firm or new to the market). These phenomena are referred to as 
                                                 
3 Hægeland and Møen (2007b) report that firms that previously did not invest in R&D are more likely to 
start doing so as a result of SkatteFUNN, the Norwegian R&D tax credit system. 
 
 10
behavioral innovations, i.e. the way firms behave differently in terms of innovation 
output. They are also often referred to as second-order effects as opposed to first-order 
effects (on R&D) and third-order effects (on firm performance measures such as 
productivity or profitability).   
 
Second- and third-order effects can be estimated within some version of the Crépon-
Duguet-Mairesse (CDM) model. It consists in modeling R&D intensity, innovation 
output (INNO) and productivity (PROD) as a system of simultaneous equations. In a first 
equation, firm’s R&D is explained by the R&D tax credits (TC) and other controls; in the 
second equation firm’s  share of innovative products in total sales is explained by the 
R&D intensity; and in a third equation total factor productivity (level or growth) is 
explained by the share of innovative sales:  
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+++=
+++Π=
++++=
itiititit
itiititit
itiitititit
NONIPROD
DRINNO
uTCXDR
υθγκη
εθγψϕ
θαδβ
3
2
ˆ
&ˆ
&
W
Z
   (1) 
 
where each equation has a random error component and iθ  is an individual effect that 
plays out differently in each equation (in the case of panel data). The system of 
simultaneous equations (1) can be estimated by asymptotic least squares or instrumental 
variable methods and allows estimating the second- and third-order effects of the fiscal 
incentives. If estimated in logs, the coefficient ψ can be interpreted as the elasticity of the 
innovative output with respect to R&D, which in turn is a function of the fiscal incentives 
and other covariates. The second-order effect of the tax credits can be computed as the 
product of the partial effects (elasticities if variables are in logs):  
 
ψα ⋅=∂
∂⋅∂
∂=∂
∂
DR
INNO
TC
DR
TC
INNO
&
&
.      (2) 
 
Similarly, a third-order effect of the fiscal incentives on firm productivity can be 
computed as the product of the three partial effects (elasticities):   
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Lokshin and Mohnen (2007a) report for the Netherlands a short-run elasticity of R&D to 
the user cost of R&D 0.77, an elasticity of the share of innovative sales to the R&D 
intensity of 0.52 and an elasticity of total factor productivity growth to the share of 
innovative sales of 0.07. The total elasticity of PROD with respect to TC is thus equal to 
0.028, implying that a 10% increase in tax credits would increase (labor) productivity by 
0.28%. The advantage of the simultaneous-equations model over reduced form models is 
that it permits to disentangle the effects of tax incentives on innovation input, innovation 
output and productivity. 
 
Another approach would be to estimate directly a reduced form of innovation or 
economic performance on the user cost of R&D. This approach is attractive for its 
simplicity. It was used by Brouwer et al. (2002) in the first official evaluation of the R&D 
tax incentive for the Netherlands. They regressed various innovation output measures 
such as the share in total sales of innovative products on received tax credits and found 
that a 1% higher amount of tax credits leads to a 19 % higher share of innovative sales in 
the short-run. Similarly, Cappelen et al (2008) use this approach on two cross-sections of 
Norwegian firms for 2001 and 2004 to study the effects of the Norwegian SkatteFUNN 
R&D support scheme on firm innovation activities and patenting. They find that the 
SkatteFUNN credits have a positive impact on the new (or improved) product for the 
firm, but not the new (or improved) product for the market.  
 
Parsons and Phillips (2007) calculate the net welfare gain of R&D tax incentives 
following the cost-benefit framework suggested by Lattimore (1997). From a 
comprehensive survey of estimates reported in the literature, they take the median values 
of the R&D incrementality ratio (0.86) and of the domestic external rate of return to R&D 
(0.56), and they compute an average marginal excess burden of taxation of 0.27. The 
compliance and administration costs in proportion of the tax incentives provided are set 
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at 8% and 2% respectively.4 For these parameter values, they estimate a net welfare 
effect per dollar of tax expenditure of 10.9%.  
 
3. Sensitivity analysis 
 
It is a daunting task to assess the exact magnitude of all the elements that enter a proper 
cost-benefit analysis. It involves parameter estimates with more or less high standard 
errors. An alternative would be to perform a sensitivity analysis by simulating the 
benefit-cost ratio using ranges of reasonable estimates of R&D responsiveness, 
opportunity costs, externalities, administration and implementation costs, rates of time 
preference, differential responsiveness by firm size, or possible differences in the rates of 
return on marginal R&D projects stimulated by the tax incentives compared to the rates 
of returns earned on already performed R&D projects, to see what patterns of estimates 
of the various determinants would produce a positive net welfare gain. An exercise of this 
kind is conducted by Parsons and Phillips (2007) for Canada. They report for instance 
that the domestic external return would have to fall to 0.45 or the incrementality ratio to 
0.71, all other things equal, to produce a net welfare loss per dollar of R&D tax incentive. 
Nevertheless they conclude that for a reasonable range of estimates the net welfare gain 
of R&D tax incentives is positive. 
  
Instead of comparing the costs and benefits in the period just after the introduction of a 
new policy or at the new long-run equilibrium (assuming it gets reached in one shot), we 
argue that it is more appropriate to compare the whole sequence of costs and benefits, in 
discounted present value terms, before and after the introduction, the removal or the 
modification of R&D tax incentives. The timing at which costs and benefits occur may 
make a difference. Costs and benefits may be spread out over time because of adjustment 
costs in R&D, delays in getting the R&D tax credits, or inter-temporal connections 
between tax credits as in the case of incremental R&D tax credits. This type of reasoning 
                                                 
4 The recent Dutch evaluation of its R&D tax incentive system (de Jong and Verhoeven, 2007) reports 
compliance and administration costs of 7% and 2%, figures that are very close to those reported for Canada 
(Parsons and Phillips, 2007). 
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has been applied in Dagenais, Mohnen, Therrien (2004) and Lokshin and Mohnen 
(2007b).  
 
In our sensitivity analysis of the incrementality ratio (or bang for the buck) to the 
elements that enter a proper cost-benefit analysis, we draw on the approach proposed in 
Lokshin and Mohnen (2007b). The latter contribution estimates a dynamic factor demand 
model. Assuming a CES approximation to the production function, static expectations on 
prices and output, it obtains an expression for the long-run optimal R&D stock, which is 
a function of firm and industry output and the price of R&D (user cost). Dynamics is 
introduced into the model by assuming that the R&D stock follows a partial adjustment 
mechanism. The expression for the user cost, which plays a central role in firms’ 
decisions to increase/decrease R&D investments, is derived from the equality between 
the discounted value of the net (after income tax) “rental” cost of a unit of R&D and the 
net (of tax incentives) purchase price of that same unit and is given by the following 
expression: 
 
{ }iiiLiRRi RwrPu τκγττδ −−−−+= )()1(1 1 1)(                 (4) 
 
where  is the R&D deflator, r is the real interest rate, RP δ is the depreciation rate of the 
stock of knowledge assumed to be 15%, τ is the corporate income tax rate, is the 
percentage of labor costs in total R&D, 
L
iw
)( ii Rγ is the fraction of private R&D supported by 
the tax incentive program, itself taxable, and iκ  is the fraction of total R&D expenditures 
that can be immediately expensed.5 (.)iγ  depends on because firms that fall in the 
second bracket of R&D expenditures benefit from a lower rate of R&D tax credit. 
iR
iκ is 
different from one because the capital expenditures part of R&D cannot be immediately 
expensed. 
 
                                                 
5 For more details on the construction of the user cost of R&D for the Netherlands, see Lokshin and 
Mohnen (2007b). 
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Using the estimated short- and long-run elasticities from such factor-demand model we 
propose to measure the bang for the buck by the following expression: 
 
.
)1/()~(
)1/()~(
1
1
1
1
∑∑
∑∑
∞
=
−
∞
=
−
+−
+−
=
i t
t
itit
i t
t
itit
rWW
rRR
BFTB               (5) 
 
where   is the R&D expenditure of firm i in period t that the firm would have incurred 
in the absence of a change in the R&D tax credit and 
itR
itR
~ the corresponding R&D 
expenditure after the change in the R&D tax credit; and itW itW
~ are the respective R&D 
cost of firm i supported by government. 
  
To illustrate our proposed measure of cost effectiveness and its sensitivity to the 
incorporation of costs and benefits other than those directly related to changes in the 
R&D tax incentives, we simulate a set of 1000 observations, replicating the composition 
of the Dutch population of R&D performers. The Dutch R&D tax incentive scheme, 
known as WBSO, allows firms to deduct from their social security contributions 40% of 
their R&D labor costs up to €110,000 and 14% of the remainder with a cap on total tax 
incentives of €7.9 million. We assume that the R&D stock adjusts to its desired level by a 
partial adjustment mechanism, whereby in every period a fraction λ of the desired 
adjusment is accomplished. We use the estimated R&D price elasticities and adjustment 
speeds of R&D (parameters σλ  and λ ) estimated in Lokshin and Mohnen (2007b) for 
Dutch firms: an estimated λ of 0.58 for large firms and 0.51 for small firms, an estimated 
short-run price elasticity of R&D stock σλ  of 0.11 for large firms and 0.31 for small 
firms, and a long-run price elasticity σ of 0.20 for large firms and 0.61 for small firms.6
 
Our simulated data set is constructed as follows: in the first step we draw a random 
sample of 1000 observations on R&D from a uniform distribution with a minimum of 
                                                 
6 A higher R&D price elasticity for small firms vis-à-vis large firms is also reported in Baghana and 
Mohnen, 2009. 
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€500 and a maximum corresponding to the first bracket ceiling of €110,000. This sub-
sample represents a cohort of small firms and starters whose R&D expenditures fall 
entirely in the first bracket. In the second step, we similarly draw another sample of 1000 
observations on R&D from a uniform distribution with a minimum of 110,001 Euro and a 
maximum that corresponds to a total of tax support set at €7.9 million. This sub-sample 
represents a cohort of larger firms whose R&D expenditures span over the two brackets. 
Our final sample on which we perform simulation experiments corresponds to 75% of 
observations randomly drawn from the first cohort and 25% observations randomly 
drawn from the second cohort.7 The mean R&D of the small- and big-firm cohorts are 
€56,000 and €3,907,000, respectively, with an overall sample mean of €956,000.  
 
In addition to the random sample, and in order to increase the variation in the 
subsequently constructed user cost, we randomly draw a number of other parameters. We 
draw the share of labor R&D expenditures from a normal distribution with a mean of 0.7 
and a standard deviation of 0.18. We truncate the maximum of the wage share to unity. 
We then create the remaining R&D expenditure shares mimicking the actual data values 
(share of R&D spent on equipment, buildings and other R&D expenditures), ensuring 
that all the shares sum up to unity.  
 
In the final step, we construct the user cost of R&D using the simulated R&D data using 
expression (5).  
 
Using the simulated R&D data that mimics the population of R&D performers in the 
Netherlands, and the estimated parameters from the dynamic factor-demand model, we 
are in a position to carry-out a number of experiments to examine how the incrementality 
ratio would change in response to changes in the tax incentives scheme, firm’s tax 
positions, externalities, administration and implementation costs. We conduct the 
following experiments: 1) complete removal of the tax incentives scheme (our, 
benchmark case) 2) sensitivity to changes in rates of time preference, differential 
responsiveness by firm size 3) sensitivity to the inclusion of administration costs, social 
                                                 
7 In the Netherlands SMEs make up about 75% of all firms (see de Jong and Verhoeven, 2007). 
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rates of return, i.e. spillovers. We begin with the base case, computed according to 
equation (5), which we summarize in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3 Components for the computation of the bang for the buck (equation (4)) 
 
time Change in R&D expenditures ( tt RR −~ ) Change in foregone tax revenues ( tt WW −~ ) 
   
1 11
1 )/( RR uuK Δ∂∂  )~(])(~)~(~[)1( 111111 RRRRRRwL −+−− τκγγτ  
2 11
1 )/( RR uuK Δ∂∂δ   112 )/( RR uuK Δ∂∂+  
 
)~(])(~)~(~[)1( 222222 RRRRRRw
L −+−− τκγγτ
3 11
2
1
1 )//( RRR uuKuK Δ∂∂+∂∂δ  
11
3 )/( RR uuK Δ∂∂+  
~ ~ ~~( ) (])( )[)1( 333333 RRRRRRw
L −+−− τκγγτ
 
. . . 
t 11
1
1
2
1
1 )/...//( RRtRR uuKuKuK Δ∂∂++∂∂+∂∂ −δ  
 11 )/( RRt uuK Δ∂∂+
)~(])(~)~(~[)1( tttttt
L RRRRRRw −+−− τκγγτ  
Notes: R stands for R&D expenditures, K for R&D stock, δ is the depreciation rate of the R&D 
stock, the subscripts correspond to time periods starting with period 1 when the policy shock 
takes place, superscript ~ denotes values after the policy shock. The derivative  
represents the change in desired R&D stock in period j after the change in the user cost of R&D 
due to a change in R&D tax incentives in period 1 ( ). In Lokshin and Mohnen’s (2007b) 
model, it is given by 
1/ Rj uK ∂∂
1
RuΔ
R
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R
i
u
K
u
K
1
1
1
~
)1( −−−=∂
∂ λσλ . 
 
In our base experiment we assess the costs and benefits of a complete removal of R&D 
tax credits, i.e. setting 0(.)~ =γ . This policy shock leads to an increase in the user cost of 
R&D. As a consequence, firms decrease their R&D investment and at the same time 
government no longer needs to support the WBSO. When the adjustment to the new 
optimal R&D stock is completed firms have reached a new steady state with lower R&D 
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expenditures and as a result a decreased optimal R&D stock. Firms, from whatever 
position they are in (it need not be a steady state equilibrium), strive to adjust to the new 
steady state corresponding to the change in the user cost of R&D. To arrive at the new 
steady-state R&D stock firms decrease their R&D investment and hence government 
saves on foregone tax revenues by no longer supporting the R&D incentive scheme.  
 
In order to track how the incrementality ratio (4) changes over time as firms adjust to the 
new steady state we need to compute changes in R&D flows (and associated government 
expenditures for R&D support) for each firm from time t=1 onwards. Table 3 summarizes 
the old and the new trajectory of R&D flows for a particular firm (for ease of notation the 
index i has been removed) and the tax revenues foregone by government from period one 
onwards. As we assume a geometric adjustment towards the new steady state, it will 
theoretically take for forever to reach the new desired stock, although it is essentially 
reached after 15 to 20 years.  In order to estimate the BFTB we compute the ratio of the 
accumulated discounted differences in R&D expenditures from period one onwards till 
infinity between the two scenarios (with and without the R&D tax credits) to the 
accumulated discounted government savings due to the scheme’s removal.  
 
Since the tax support is more generous towards small and medium sized enterprises, it is 
of interest to compare the effectiveness of the tax credit policy for SMEs and large 
enterprises. To illustrate the impact of the removal of the R&D tax scheme, Figure 1 plots 
the estimated BFTB, which is computed as given in equation (5) and according to the 
evolution given in Table 3. We report the plots for small firms (whose R&D falls entirely 
in the first bracket of the Dutch R&D tax incentive scheme) and for bigger firms (whose 
R&D spans over the two brackets of the scheme). The BFTB after one period is above 
unity only for smaller firms. But, it declines rapidly and converges to a point slightly 
below unity for small firms and well below unity for large firms. Although our sample is 
created so as to mimic the actual population of scheme’s users, the overall BFTB line is 
closer to the one that pertains to large firms, the total R&D of which dominates the 
sample.  
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 Figure 1: Mean BFTB after t years: all, large, and small firms 
0
.5
1
1.
5
m
ea
n 
B
FT
B
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Years
large firms small firms
all firms
 
 
The rapid decline of the BFTB is due to the transfer cost (or deadweight loss) caused by 
the level-based nature of the fiscal incentive scheme. Intuitively, government supports 
any increment in R&D to the extent that it allows this R&D to be immediately expensed 
(in some countries, but not in the Netherlands, it also provides an increment-based R&D 
tax credit), but by introducing the level-based WBSO the Dutch government also 
supports the level of R&D that existed at the time the policy was introduced, i.e. an 
amount of R&D that would have been performed in the absence of the tax credits. The 
support of the latter is a deadweight loss from the social planner’s perspective. The 
transfer cost amounts to 88% of the total cost accruing to the government for supporting 
the tax incentive scheme. The latter is computed by adding the first terms in the second 
column of table 3 and dividing it by the sum of the total elements of column 2 (summing 
over all firms and appropriately discounting). 
 
Given our modeling assumptions, the curvature of the evolution of the BFTB curve and 
the behavior of R&D investment can be shown to depend on the R&D stock depreciation 
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rate δ , the partial adjustment coefficientλ and the discount rate (1+r)-1.  The increase in 
adjustment coefficient leads to a steeper BFTB curve and an upward shift of the curve. 
The increase in depreciation rate δ leads to flatter curve and downward shift in the curve. 
Figure 2 illustrates the difference in the cumulative bang for the buck for three scenarios: 
the baseline case, reproducing the middle curve in Fig.1, and the curves that correspond 
to a higher speed in the adjustment of R&D stock (0.65 instead of 0.5) and a higher 
depreciation rate for the R&D stock (0.25 instead of 0.15).  
 
Figure 2: Mean BFTB after t years, all firms  
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In all our experiments so far we observe that firms respond to the removal of R&D tax 
credits by decreasing their R&D investment in the first period following the policy 
change; however their R&D behavior in the subsequent periods depends on the relative 
magnitudes of δ and λ .  It can be shown (the proof is available from authors upon 
request) that in the model of Lokshin and Mohnen (2007b) an initial drop in R&D 
expenditures due to the removal of the level-based R&D tax credit will be followed by a 
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lower drop (compared to the initial level of R&D expenditures) in the subsequent periods 
when λδ < .  When λδ > , R&D levels will keep declining more and more until a new 
steady state is reached. We observe that small firms are quite responsive to the shock. 
The initial drop (from t=1 to t=2) in average R&D spending is steeper for smaller firms 
compared to large firms: it is about 55% for small firms and 7.5% for large firms. The 
total drop from the initial shock to the point of convergence some 10 periods later is 
about 16% for the small firms and is only 2.0% for the large firms.  
 
To do a more accurate cost-benefit analysis we shall follow the example of Parsons and 
Phillips (2007) and compute a net welfare gain including the BTFB, the social return to 
R&D, administration and compliance costs, and the cost of distortionary taxes. 
Accounting for the social rate of return to R&D, i.e. including the effects of R&D 
spillovers, amounts to multiplying the numerator of equation (5) by (1+ φ) where φ is the 
social rate of return to R&D and subtracting the taxes paid on the social returns to R&D 
from the tax revenues foregone in the denominator. Accounting for administration and 
compliance costs (c) amounts to multiplying that part of the denominator of (4) that 
relates to the R&D tax credit (the first terms in column 2 of table 3) by (1+c). Accounting 
for the costs of distortionary taxes (d) amounts to multiplying the whole denominator of 
(5) by (1+d).  
 
Several parameters, such as the interest rate and the corporate income tax rate, that we 
use in the simulation reproduce the Dutch data. The remaining parameters are allowed to 
take a range of values and allow us to examine the robustness of the outcomes to 
variations in these parameters. For example, to examine the sensitivity to the social 
returns to R&D (which include R&D spillovers) we take a range from 10% to 50%.  
Values of 50% do not seem to be extraordinary large. For example, most of the 
calibration outcomes reported in Jones and Williams (2000) produce values of R&D 
spillovers greater than 40%. The administration and compliance costs roughly correspond 
to the values reported from face-to-face interviews with firm managers and government 
agency administrators in the latest evaluation of the Dutch WBSO program (de Jong and 
Verhoeven, 2007) 
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 In table 4 we summarize the outcomes of various sensitivity analyses on the short-run and 
long-run net welfare gains.  Introducing a 10 percent administration and compliance cost 
decreases even further the benefit/cost ratio, although its effect on the long-run welfare 
gain appears minimal. Adding a 30 percent additional cost of distortionary taxation 
reduces the benefit/cost ratio even further down to 0.28 in the long run. When we express 
the benefits in terms of social returns assuming a 10% social rate of return on R&D, we 
obtain a net welfare gain of 7 percent in the short run and of 3 percent in the long run. If 
we allow for a 30% social rate of return the net welfare gain rises to 22 percent in the 
short run and 9 percent in the long run. If we put the social rate of return to 50% (which 
is close to the median return reported by Parsons and Phillips (2007) the net welfare gain 
rises to 38 percent in the short run and 16 percent in the long run.  The long-run outcomes 
are always smaller than the short-run outcomes because of the deadweight loss. The 16 
percent net welfare gain from R&D tax incentives in the Netherlands is close to the 11 
percent figure reported by Parsons and Phillips (2007).  
 
Table 4 Benefit/cost analysis from a removal of level-based R&D tax credits 
 
 Scenarios Short-run net 
welfare gain  
Long-run net 
welfare gain 
 Base case   
1 Bang for the buck 0.91 0.37 
    
 Adding to the base case   
2 10 cent administration and compliance cost 0.84 0.34 
3 10 cent administration and compliance cost, and  
30% cost of distortionary taxation 
0.65 0.26 
4 10 cent administration and compliance cost,  30% 
cost of distortionary taxation and 10% social rate of 
return 
0.07 0.03 
5 10 cent administration and compliance cost,  30% 
cost of distortionary taxation and 30% social rate of 
return 
0.21 0.09 
6 10 cent administration and compliance cost,  30% 
cost of distortionary taxation and 50% social rate of 
return 
0.36 0.15 
    
 BFTB for different size distributions   
7 43% of small firms 0.94 0.40 
8 23% of small firms 0.83 0.34 
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4. Policy experiments 
 
Parameters of the fiscal incentive schemes rarely stay constant over time. Governments 
may wish to give an additional boost to R&D or increase the stimulus for a particular 
target group (e.g., starting firms, small and medium sized enterprises, etc.).  For example, 
the Dutch scheme parameters have varied a number of times since 1994. The first bracket 
ceiling was extended from €45,000 to €68,000 (in 1996), later to €90,000 (in 2001) and 
most recently to €110,000 (in 2004).  The first bracket rate was increased from 25% to 
40% in 1996 and most recently to 42% (in 2004). The second bracket rate was increased 
most recently from 13% to 14% (in 2004). A special first bracket rate exceeding the 
normal first bracket rate by 20% was introduced for starting firms in 2001. A question 
that naturally arises is how sensitive firms are to marginal changes in the fiscal incentive 
scheme parameters. In order to answer this question, we performed some additional 
experiments in which we simulated the effect of a marginal change in a parameter of the 
tax scheme holding all other parameters constant.  
 
Changes in the scheme’s parameters lead to changes in the user cost and may thus affect 
a firm’s R&D decisions. From our experiments we conclude, however, that the impact on 
the user cost is not substantial when the changes in the tax scheme’s parameters are 
small. For example, an increase in the first bracket rate of 2% results in a change of the 
B-index from 0.71 to 0.73 in our simulated sample and a decrease of the user cost of 
0.2% on average for firms which are in the first bracket and has practically no impact on 
the larger firms.  The decrease in the user cost prompts a modest response in terms of the 
increased R&D spending of about 2.5% in the first period (for small firms), which 
gradually declines to about 1.3% in the long run. The results also suggest that the 
response for large firms to changes in the first bracket rate in terms of additional R&D is 
negligible.  
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When the first bracket length is extended by €20,000 or the second bracket rate is 
increased by 1% we observe very little change in the user cost (magnitudes of the order 
of 0.1%). The increase in R&D levels due to the extension of the first bracket, even for 
small firms, is about 0.3% in the short run. The increase in R&D levels for large firms 
due to the increase in the second bracket rate is about 0.5% in the short run.  This latter 
experiment is of course not relevant for small firms, whose R&D by definition lies 
entirely in the first bracket.   
 
Our experiments with introducing marginal changes in the schemes’s parameters show 
that in terms of the increased R&D spending the impact of marginal changes in the fiscal 
incentive scheme are limited. The most promising change from the policy perspective is 
the increase in the first bracket rate which prompts almost a proportional increase in the 
R&D spending in small firms, but this effect declines as firms adjust to the new steady 
state.  We find minimal impact of the marginal changes in the scheme’s parameters in 
terms of the R&D spending for large firms. 
 
It is often the case that fiscal incentive schemes aim a particular target group. This could 
be small and medium size enterprises, young firms or firms in a particular (technological) 
sector. The policy of preferential treatment of small firms is justified from the point of 
view of government because SMEs are likely to be more reactive to the changes in R&D 
tax incentives. On the one hand, this is due to their relatively greater difficulty in 
financing their R&D as a result of having little collateral; on the other hand, they may be 
young firms with little to show in terms of success, they may not even have patents to 
signal their capability to innovate. 
 
The simulation experiments that we carried out so far suggest that the preferential 
treatment of smaller firms for R&D tax credits is justified. R&D tax credits are more 
effective in stimulating R&D investment in small firms and are quite wasteful in terms of 
cost-benefit for large firms. As a final experiment we investigate the impact in terms of 
the cost-benefit of a compositional change in the population of users. We do this by 
drawing a sample of 1000 observations from a uniform distribution with a minimum of 
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R&D expenditures of €500 and a maximum set equal to €250,000 in one case, which 
corresponds to an R&D department of about 5 people and to €500,000 in the second case.  
When the maximum R&D is set at €250,000 the share of small firms in our sample is 
43% and the share of their R&D in the total is 20%. The results of these experiments are 
summarized in Table 4. The initial BFTB for the whole sample is close to unity, and it is 
well below unity in the long run. Increasing the maximum R&D to €500,000 reduces the 
share of small firms to 23% and the share of their R&D to 5%, while the BFTB for the 
whole sample becomes even smaller. Increasing the share of small firms (which, as 
before, are defined as those with an R&D that falls entirely in the first bracket) increases 
the overall BFTB, but not by a substantial amount.  
 
The Cornet and Vroomen (2005) study is one of the few that have evaluated the 
effectiveness of changes in the R&D incentive scheme. They examined the result of two 
changes in the Dutch WBSO system that were introduced in 2001: the increase of the 
ceiling of the first bracket from €68,067 to €90,756 and the introduction of the starter’s 
facility that provides an extra 20 percent tax credit for firms in the first bracket. Using 
counterfactuals analyses, the authors find that the increase of the first bracket ceiling 
yields a BFTB of only 10 to 20 cent and the introduction of the starter’s facility a BFTB 
of 50 to 80 cent. The low estimates could in part be due to difficulties in identifying the 
respective effects, but are also in line with the results of our simulation.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have tried to demystify the conventional wisdom that an effective tax 
incentive policy should lead to a cost effectiveness ratio, or bang for the buck, greater 
than one. With level-based tax incentives, this ratio can quickly fall below one because of 
a transfer cost, or deadweight loss, resulting from supporting R&D that would be done 
anyway. In this sense, level-based tax incentives are akin to R&D subsidies. A cost-
effectiveness ratio smaller than one is, however, not sufficient to condemn the R&D tax 
incentive policy for being inefficient. What matters is the net welfare gain of such a 
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policy, i.e. whether the social return of the additional R&D exceeds the net compliance, 
administration, and opportunity costs of public funding. 
 
We performed a sensitivity analysis by simulating the net welfare gain under various 
scenarios and parameters. Our general conclusion is that using reasonable estimates of 
the various components of the net welfare gains and simulated data representative of the 
Dutch population of R&D performers, the R&D tax incentive scheme leads to a positive 
net welfare gain.  We further conclude that in the presence of adjustment costs in R&D, 
administrative delays in paying the tax incentives, or other reasons for irregular and 
asymmetric distributions of costs and benefits over time, it is important to consider the 
time path of the realizations of the social costs and benefits, as we have illustrated in 
section 3.  
 
In addition to the sensitivity analysis we also performed a number of policy experiments 
to examine the relative effectiveness of the incremental changes in fiscal incentives 
scheme’s parameters on stimulating additional private R&D. In particular, we considered 
the following effects 1) changes in fiscal incentives scheme parameters 2) compositional 
changes in fiscal incentives scheme’s beneficiaries. The logic behind these experiments is 
that changes in the tax scheme parameters lead to changes in the user cost of R&D and 
may therefore affect a firm’s R&D decisions. Based on our experiments, we conclude, 
however, that the response, especially for the large firms, to changes in the first bracket 
rate in terms of additional R&D is negligible. Our general conclusion is that changing the 
value of the R&D tax parameters does not make a great difference in terms of net welfare 
gains. 
 
In designing a fiscal incentive scheme an important choice to be made by policymakers is 
between a level-based and an increment-based R&D tax credit system. With a level-
based system (volume regulation) any R&D performed is eligible for tax credits, whereas 
with an increment-based system only R&D that exceeds a base level is eligible for R&D 
tax credits. The reference point in the incremental scheme can be the amount of R&D in a 
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reference year or the average expenditures over a number of years. Most countries that 
have a fiscal incentive scheme opt for a volume-based regulation.  
Few countries implement the incremental system, e.g. the United States, Spain, Ireland, 
Portugal and, up to recently, France (Nill, 2005). There are good reasons for it. First, 
increment-based schemes are more difficult and costly to administer. Second, they lead to 
market distortions and uncertainty among firms. Indeed they encourage firms to have a 
cycling R&D behavior to maximize the benefits of tax incentives (see Hollander, Haurie 
and L’Ecuyer, 1987 and Lemaire, 1996). Third, they are limited in their effects as any 
increase in R&D in a given year reduces the possibility to claim tax credits in future years 
(at least when the reference base is a moving base).  
 
However, as we have shown, volume-based schemes are inefficient because they involve 
large transfer costs by supporting pre-existing R&D that would have been done even in 
the absence of R&D tax credits, a weakness not shared by incremental R&D tax credit 
schemes. While previous research acknowledges the transfer cost in the volume-based 
schemes (e.g. Russo, 2004), which tends to lead to a bang for the buck below one, the 
value of one is still largely considered as the sign of an effective tax incentive policy.  
But even if the cost effectiveness ratio is below one, a level-based R&D tax incentive 
policy could still be defended of spillovers are large enough (as also argued by Russo 
(2004), Cornet and Vroomen (2005), Wilson (2005), and Parsons and Phillips (2007)). 
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